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Abstract. The paper examines definitions of ‘cause’ in the epidemiological literature. Those 
definitions all describe causes as factors that make a difference to the distribution of disease 
or to individual health status. In the philosophical jargon, causes in epidemiology are 
difference-makers. Two claims are defended. First, it is argued that those definitions 
underpin an epistemology and a methodology that hinge upon the notion of variation, contra 
the dominant Humean paradigm according to which we infer causality from regularity. 
Second, despite the fact that causes be defined in terms of ‘difference-making’, this cannot 
fixes the causal metaphysics. Causality in epidemiology ought to be interpreted according to 
the epistemic theory. In this approach relations are deemed causal depending on the evidence 
and on the available methods. Indeed, evidence to establish causal claims requires difference-
making considerations; furthermore, those definitions of cause reflect the ‘variational’ 
epistemology and methodology of epidemiology. 
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1. Definitions of cause in epidemiology 
Epidemiology studies the distributions of diseases in and across populations and 
seeks to identify the factors determining those distributions. This broad 
characterisation of epidemiological research raises altogether substantial issues of 
broad philosophical interest. One concerns adopting an explicit causal stance, which 
is sometimes avoided perhaps as a consequence of humbleness of researchers in 
claiming to find causal relations. Thus, a plain causal terminology is sometimes 
replaced with a less obvious and more confusing one, using terms such as factors, 
determinants, but not causes and effects. This is certainly an important issue to 
debate. Nevertheless, I will take here for granted that an explicit causal stance is 
justifiable (let alone desirable) and shall tackle another problem arising in causal 
reasoning in epidemiology.  
Various definitions of cause can be found in textbooks and survey papers in 
epidemiology. Parascandola and Weed (2001) analyse an extensive body of 
philosophical and scientific literature and come up with five possible definitions of 
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cause: production, necessary causes, sufficient-component causes, probabilistic 
causes, and counterfactual causes. Unfortunately, none of these succeeds in attracting 
a unique consensus nor in accounting for different causal scenarios in epidemiology. 
To illustrate, consider a ‘necessary’ definition of cause: this fits the case of AIDS, for 
HIV infection is a necessary cause of AIDS; however, necessary causes don’t seem to 
suit the case of cancer, for exposure to any carcinogenic substance is neither 
necessary nor sufficient to develop cancer. Yet, Parascandola and Weed (2001) say 
that the probabilistic account provides a better picture, as it can encompass other 
definitions (e.g., sufficient causes raise the probability of its effect occurring to 1, 
necessary causes raise that probability from 0) and because it accounts for the fact 
that different factors have a different impact on the disease. According to their 
definition: 
A probabilistic cause increases the probability of its effect occurring. Such a cause need 
not to be either necessary or sufficient. (Parascandola and Weed, 2001, p.906) 
The literature offers germane definitions of ‘cause’: 
A determinant [of health] can be any factor, whether event, characteristic, or other 
definable entity so long as it brings about change for better or worse in a health 
condition. (Susser, 1973, p. 3) 
 
[…] a factor is a cause of an event if its operation increases the frequency of the event. 
(Elwood 1988, p.5) 
 
Being a cause is a special characterisation of some state of affairs characterised by 
change, i.e. an event, a fact, a state or a deed: in medicine and epidemiology, a cause 
makes a disease happen or not happen. (Karhausen 2000, p. 59) 
 
A factor is a cause of a certain disease when alterations in the frequency or intensity of 
this factor, without concomitant alterations in any other factor, are followed by changes 
in the frequency of occurrence of the disease, after the passage of a certain time period. 
(Lagiou et al., 2005, p. 565) 
All these definitions have something in common. In slightly different ways they all 
say what a causal factor does, and what it does is to make changes: changes in 
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frequencies of disease or changes in the health status of individuals. In the 
philosophical jargon, according to those definitions, causes are difference-makers.  
The goal of this paper is to offer a critical evaluation of those definitions, notably 
to discuss the kind of epistemology, methodology and metaphysics of causation they 
underpin. In section 2, I shall argue that these definitions support an epistemology 
and a methodology of causality that hinge upon the notion of variation rather than 
regularity. However, things get more complicated concerning the underlying 
metaphysics. In section 3, I shall argue that (i) even though these definitions describe 
causes as difference-makers, this does not necessarily fix a ‘difference-making’ causal 
metaphysics; (ii) instead, causality is better interpreted according to the epistemic 
theory; and (iii) the fact that these definitions describe causes as difference-makers 
rather reflects the ‘variational’ methodology and epistemology of epidemiology.  
2. Causal epistemology and methodology 
Preliminaries 
The definitions mentioned in Sec. 1 describe a cause in terms of what it does, namely 
producing changes in frequencies of disease or in individual health status. I shall now 
ask what kind of epistemology and methodology do such definitions underpin; the 
answer—we shall see—turns out to be that those definitions sustain a fundamental 
variational aspect of the epistemology and methodology of causality. Before getting 
started, let me make clear from the outset the question I am asking. 
The epistemology of causality investigates how we come to know about causal 
relations. Here, there is a fleeting borderline between epistemology and methodology, 
but a line between the two can be drawn nonetheless. Whilst methodology is 
concerned with problems of scientific methods and aims at developing successful 
methods for the discovery and confirmation of causal relationships, epistemology is 
rather interested in the conceptual issues behind those methods. Examples of causal 
methods include Bayesian nets, regression models, structural models, multilevel 
models, etc. Such methods, although customarily used in the everyday scientific 
practice, presuppose a number of crucial epistemological questions such as: if 
correlations do not grant causality what does? Is there epistemic access to causal 
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relations other than correlations or randomization? Do mechanisms grant better 
epistemic access to causal relations than correlations or randomization? Can generic 
causal knowledge inform causal attribution in the single-case?  
The philosophical literature produced a whole variety of answers, yet in many 
ways Hume’s heritage is still dominant. In the Humean tradition, also known as 
“regularism”, a token-event c caused a token-event e if and only if events of type E 
regularly follow events of type C. For instance, one infers that smoking causes lung 
cancer because we observed that cancer-events steadily follow smoking-events; one 
might then infer that Harry’s smoking caused him to develop lung cancer because 
lung cancer typically follows smoking. Nevertheless, this intuition has some 
plausibility only because the relation between smoking and lung cancer—indeed, 
between almost all types of cancer—is well established (Vineis et al. 2004). But 
consider more controversial (causal) relations. Is it because exposure to 
electromagnetic fields is regularly followed by cancer that epidemiologists 
(tentatively) establish a causal relation between the two? 
So a central problem in epistemology is what notion or principle guides causal 
reasoning: whatever causality is, what notion guides our reasoning in making 
inferences to establish causal relations? This is a peculiar question about 
epistemology and it is most relevant to methodology. In Russo (2006 and 2008), 
contra the dominant Humean paradigm, I argue that model building and model testing 
in the social sciences turn around the notion of variation, not of regularity. Simply put, 
a causal model is built around meaningful co-variations between the variables of 
interest and tests are performed in order to establish which variations are causal. One 
requirement, among others, is that in large data sets the co-variation between 
variables also show some regularity. This does not mean that the scientist infers 
causal relations from regular successions à la Hume, but that the scientist requires co-
variations to be regular enough in order to rule out accidental or spurious relations 
(Russo 2008, ch.4). In the following, I shall try to show that epistemology and 




A case for a ‘variational’ epistemology can be made by appealing to the goals of 
epidemiology. Epidemiologists usually claim that their goal is to study the variability 
of disease due to the variability of exposure. Isolated and independent voices1 are 
brilliantly summarised by Bhopol (1997 and 1999), who carried out a systematic 
review of epidemiology textbooks and came to the following conclusion (Bhopol 
1999, p.1162): 
Certain beliefs—that epidemiology is about the study of health and disease in 
populations, that there is a population group variation in disease that is worth of scientific study, 
and that such variation is important to public health policy and practice—were 
common to virtually all textbooks. (My emphasis.) 
Bhopol summarises very well the aspect of epidemiology I am concerned with: 
epidemiologists are interested in how the disease varies across individuals, time, space, 
etc. In other words, epidemiology seeks to establish causal claims by studying 
variations in exposure and in disease. It is worth pointing out that if this were merely a 
platitude about epidemiology it would not be a noteworthy and widespread belief. 
Causal epistemology is concerned with how we come to know about causal relations, 
and the answer here is that we will know about causes of disease by investigating 
whether some specific variations in exposure lead to variations in disease.  
This is definitively what the definitions of cause we read earlier point to: a causal 
factor is responsible for variations in the distribution of disease or in individual 
health status. This is can be ascertained by studying the “population group variation 
in disease”. Hence the definitions of cause underpin a variational epistemology. 
I hurriedly said that causal epistemology in epidemiology is variational, pace Hume. 
Let me develop this point further. The conceptual background pervading philosophy 
of science and scientific thinking is a paradigm of regularity, a heritage of the 
Humean conception of causation presented earlier (Hume 1748, sec.VII). However, 
if the regularity paradigm were the correct one in epidemiology, Bhopol would be 
misinterpreting the ‘common beliefs’ of epidemiologists. But perhaps Bhopol is right 
                                                     
 
1 A number of epidemiologists have explicitly supported this idea, for instance, Susser (1973), 
Timmerick (1994), Lilienfeld and Stolley (1994), Jewell (2004), just to name a few. 
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and instead Hume is misleadingly called to support causal reasoning in epidemiology. 
Wittness Karhausen (2000, p.59): 
This paper attempts to charter some of the territory of the concept of causation in 
epidemiology and its potential interactions with logic and scientific philosophy. David 
Hume looms large in this matter […]. Being a cause is a special characterisation of 
some state of affairs characterised by change, i.e. an event, a fact, a state or a deed: in 
medicine and epidemiology, a cause makes a disease happen or not happen. 
Karhausen then points to several misunderstandings of the Humean doctrine both in 
the philosophical and epidemiological literature. For instance, some authors took 
Hume as claiming that causal inference is a subjective process, or that causes are not 
real, or that induction does not exist, etc. (Karhausen 2000, p. 60). Two remarks are 
in order. The first is that Karhausen, in the quote above, is misunderstanding Hume 
too, for Hume’s influence is in the definition of cause as an object displaying regular 
behaviour—which Karhausen (2000, p.60) quotes too—not in a definition of cause 
as given above. The second is that, once again, Karhausen’s definition underpins a 
variational epistemology of causality, contra Hume, who believed that we infer 
causation from regular successions of events.  
The issue is indeed controversial and dissent with the regularist paradigm also 
comes from the quarters of the health sciences. For instance, Elwood (1988) 
complains that this paradigm of regularity is not well suited to this domain. He thinks 
that the regularist account is familiar to the physical sciences, where physical 
scenarios often exhibit a simplicity lacking in the health and social sciences. The view 
that a certain event always and invariably follows another event might well fit physics 
because the causal agent is sufficient, the time lag between the cause and the effect is 
short, and experimental conditions allow one to replicate causal relations. However, 
most situations in the health sciences do not fulfil these criteria. Whether or not 
Elwood is right about the simplicity of situations in physics I shall not investigate. 
But surely Elwood is right about epidemiology and in fact the definitions of cause we 
read earlier point to a variational epistemology not to a regularist one. 
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Variational methodology 
According to the causal epistemology sketched above, epidemiology finds out about 
causes by examining the variability of disease due to the variability of exposure. 
Methodology is concerned with how this is practically done. What I want to show next 
is that definitions of cause in epidemiology also underpin a variational methodology.  
Savitz (2003, p.35) notices that epidemiology is primarily interested in establishing 
statements such as ‘the risk of disease is x times greater among exposed persons than 
unexposed persons’. Such claims contribute to establishing causal relations through 
comparative statements, which are in fact the bulk of a variational methodology. This idea 
can be found already in Susser (1973, p. 3), where he says that epidemiology is all 
about comparing and interpreting group exposure and response. Notably, 
comparisons involve establishing whether factors make or do not make a difference, 
that is whether distributions of disease differ conditional on the exposure, whether 
relative risks are greater for exposed individuals than for non exposed individuals. 
Epidemiology, as it happens, is most often concerned with observational data 
rather than experimental data. It is apparent that the methodology of 
experimentation, e.g. in randomised clinical trials, is variational because the idea is 
just this: to see what changes occur by making certain interventions. In fact, in 
experimental studies we estimate certain predetermined outcomes of a well defined 
intervention which is deliberatively administered to certain individuals and we 
compare results with outcomes in individuals that have not been administered the 
intervention.2 Nevertheless, observational studies rely on a variational methodology 
too. Timmerick (1994, p. 326) expresses this idea very clearly:  
                                                     
 
2 No doubt the most direct tests for causation would be experimentation and intervention; yet, even 
randomised controlled trials do not ‘prove’ causation because of practical and methodological pitfalls. 
A thorough discussion of this issue falls beyond the scope of the paper and I will not reiterate 
arguments given elsewhere (see e.g., Elwood (1988), Cartwright (2007b), and Glasziou et al. (2007)). 
Let me just point out that Glasziou et al. (2007) defend the idea that observational evidence can 
indeed support causal claims, and then provide a significant number of historical examples where 
convincing causal inferences have been performed without resorting to randomized trials. Timmerick 
(1994) goes as far as claiming that observational studies provide many more insights into the effects of 
diseases. The reason is that they deal with population groups, whereas experimental studies deal with 
individuals or smaller treatments or experimental groups and therefore the inference to relations in 
large populations is limited. Of course, issues remain concerning the problem of confounding or the 
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Observational method of study is based on the concept that changes which are 
observed in one trait or variable can cause changes in another characteristics or 
variable, and those changes occur without the event being altered by the epidemiologist 
or without intervention by a researcher. 
That observational methods in epidemiology are variational in character is also 
clear from the fact that they are all comparative. Cohort studies compare individuals 
exposed to the putative cause with individuals that have not been exposed. Case-
control studies compare individuals with the disease with individual that do not have 
the disease. In cross-sectional studies data is collected at a specific point of time and 
comparisons are made for that specific moment. It is not my goal here to evaluate 
strengths, weaknesses, or applicability of those type of studies. Instead, it is my intent 
to stress their comparative aspect: the goal of epidemiological studies is to establish 
whether and how the distribution or the risk of disease varies according to the 
exposure and to other medical and social characteristics of individuals.  
Interestingly, in Timmerick the hypothesis formulation stage also involves 
reasoning about variations. Timmerick (1994, ch.10) singles out four different 
approaches to hypothesis formulation: method of difference, method of agreement, 
accompanying/co-joint variations, method of analogy.3 In the method of difference 
the formulation of the hypothesis is suggested by the fact that the frequency of 
occurrence is significantly different in different situations and conditions. We use the 
method of agreement when we hypothesise a same factor as cause of disease in case 
we identify the same risk factor acting in a variety of different circumstances. In the 
method of joint variations, the frequency of a risk factor varies with the frequency of 
the disease. Finally, in the method of analogy, hypotheses are formulated on the basis 
of similarity of risk factors and pathogen agents of similar diseases. Let me emphasise 
that hypothesis formulation mirrors a variational rather than a regularist 
epistemology. Put differently, what guides hypothesis formulation is not the 
observation of regular successions but of variations. 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
use of frequentist rather than Bayesian statistics, but those are quite perpendicular to point I am 
concerned with. 
3 The four methods listed and discussed by Timmerick clearly recall the Millian methods of 
experimental enquiry (Mill 1843), although he does not explicitly refers to them. For a discussion of 
the notion of variation in Mill’s experimental method, see Russo (2008, ch.4). 
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It is perhaps obvious, to the eyes of the epidemiologist, that causal methods hinge 
upon the notion of variation and that the definitions of cause we read at the 
beginning indeed reflect a variational methodology. Fair enough. But, perhaps, it is 
less obvious what the metaphysical import of such definitions is. This, I shall discuss 
in the next section. 
3. Causal metaphysics 
Preliminaries 
So far I argued that definitions of cause mentioned in Sec. 1 grasp the variational 
epistemology and methodology of epidemiological research. Epidemiologists are 
interested in studying variations of disease due to variations in exposure. This fixes 
the causal epistemology and methodology—viz. to look for and test variations to find 
out about causal relations. But to what extent this also determines the causal 
metaphysics to adopt? My argument continues in this section by saying that although 
the definitions of cause in Sec. 1 all point to difference-making, this does not fix a 
‘variational’ or ‘difference-making’ metaphysics; rather, this is a reflex of the 
variational epistemology and methodology of epidemiology. Let me make clear from 
the outset the question I address in this section. 
The metaphysics of causality seeks to know what causality in fact is, what kind of 
entities causes are, what do we mean when we say that A causes B. Those tasks can be 
achieved in a number of ways. Philosophers of causality provided an analysis of the 
concept of causality (e.g., Hall 2004), an account of the kind of entities causes are 
(e.g., Cartwright 1989), or developed a set of conditions under which relations 
between variables are causal (e.g., Woodward 2003). 
The philosophical literature is vast. Broadly speaking, ‘traditional’ philosophical 
theories fall into two families: those analysing causality in terms of difference-making 
and those analysing causality in terms of production and mechanisms. Probabilistic 
theories and counterfactual theories are examples of the former sort: in probabilistic 
approaches (e.g., Suppes 1970, Eells 1991, Hitchcock 1995) causes, whether positive 
or negative, are difference-makers as they change, i.e. increase or decrease, the 
probability of their effects. In Lewis’ counterfactual analysis (Lewis 1986) causes are 
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also difference-makers as ‘if the cause had not been, the effect would not have been 
either’. Examples of the latter sort of theories are, for instance, the account developed 
by Cartwright (1989), where causes are capacities having the ability or disposition to 
produce or bring about an effect, the process-based approach (Dowe 2000, Salmon 
1998) where causes are linked to effects via physical process that intersect and 
interact, or the mechanist approach (Machamer, Darden and Craver 2000, Glennan 
2002, Craver 2007), where A causes B if and only if there is a suitable mechanism 
linking the two. 
A number of criticism may be raised against these traditional accounts. Usually, 
counterexamples are construed in order to show that none of them is able to provide 
the answer to what causality is. In fact counterexamples to each of the above 
positions can be easily construed—Reiss (2009) offers a detailed overview and 
discussion of stock examples. Hence, slowly but surely, due to the failures of 
traditional philosophical theories of causation, pluralistic stances have come into range 
as the most promising solution.4 Simply put, pluralists say that causality has many 
aspects, not just one, and causal claims have many meanings, not just one. Thus, for 
instance, Hall (2004) maintains that causation involves ‘dependence’ as well as 
‘production’. Dependence and production are usually cashed out in terms of 
difference-making and mechanisms, respectively. Thus, a kind of pluralist stance 
requires that cause make a difference to the effect and that the cause be linked to the 
effect via a mechanism. Alternatively, pluralist may maintain that the right concept in 
terms of which causality has to be cashed out depends on the context. Thus, Weber 
(2007) suggests that an analysis in terms of difference-making is suitable for the 
generic level (e.g., ‘smoking causes lung cancer’), whilst an analysis in terms of 
mechanism is suitable in the single-case (e.g., ‘Harry’s smoking caused him to 
develop lung cancer’). 
But what kind of metaphysics, among the above, should epidemiologists adopt? Is 
disease causation intrinsically difference-making or mechanist? Or a combination of 
the two? Answering those questions is the task I undertake next. 
                                                     
 
4 For a discussion see, among others, Campaner and Galavotti (2007), Cartwright (2007b), DeVreese 
(2006), Godfrey-Smith (forthcoming), Hall (2004), Psillos (2008), Reiss (2009), Russo and Williamson 
(2007), Weber (2007). 
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Variational metaphysics? 
Definitions of cause in Sec. 1 consistently describe causes as difference-makers. Does 
it follow that epidemiologists should endorse a difference-making metaphysics? The 
straight answer is no, because causality in epidemiology is better interpreted 
according to the epistemic theory. 
Whilst traditional accounts cash out causality in terms of ‘probability raising’, 
‘physical process’, ‘mechanism’, or ‘capacity’, the epistemic theory (Williamson 2005, 
2006) cashes out causality in terms of an individual’s beliefs (e.g., a scientist) formed 
upon available evidence. Under the epistemic theory, causal relations are not real but 
rather ‘representational’: causality is not a feature of the physical world, but a feature 
of an individual’s set of beliefs about a phenomenon. Thus the epidemiologist, armed 
with solid epistemological and methodological tools, will deem some factors causal 
but not others depending on the evidence and methods at her disposal. IARC 
procedure to evaluate carcinogenic risks on humans are a good example to illustrate. 
The evaluation of carcinogenicity of agents is the problem of deciding whether and 
to what extent an agent causes cancer (in humans or in animals). An agent will be 
deemed carcinogenic depending on what evidence supports such a claim. The IARC 
monographs (IARC 2006) provide an extensive descriptions of the procedures for 
the evaluation of carcinogenicity. The point at stake here is that the claim ‘the agent x 
is carcinogenic to humans’ represents the evidence, methods and evaluation procedures 
used to come to such a causal conclusion. It is in this sense that causation, under the 
epistemic theory, is representational. 
Pluralist philosophers have argued, in slightly different ways, that causality is a 
multi-fold concept involving difference-making and mechanisms. However, there is a 
deep mistake in such analysis: pluralists are confusing the very concept of causality and 
the evidence to establish a causal claim. In other words, from the fact that we have 
multiple sources of evidence, it doesn’t follow that should have a multi-fold concept 
of cause. In the epistemic theory, causality is a feature of the beliefs of scientist—this 
is what the concept of causality amounts to. A different issue is the evidence needed 
in order to establish whether a factor or a relation is causal: evidence has to involve 
difference-making and mechanistic considerations. Russo and Williamson (2007) 
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offer various arguments for the claim that difference-making and mechanistic evidence 
is needed in the health sciences: (i) pluralist stances are fallacious exactly because they 
confuse the concept of causality with the types of evidence to establish causal claims; 
(ii) history of medicine has paradigmatic cases where causal claims have not been 
accepted until both difference-making and mechanistic evidence has been provided to 
support a causal claim; (iii) the need for difference-making and mechanistic evidence 
is current practice in the health sciences, as required, for instance, by IARC 
procedures to evaluate studies on carcinogenic factors. 
Adopting the epistemic theory carries many advantages. One is that the epistemic 
theory answers the worries of those who argue against an explicit causal terminology 
on the ground that the notion of cause is metaphysical, i.e. obscure and untestable. 
Here is an example. Lipton and Odegard (2005, p. 7) say:  
Our point is that although it is important to be able to use epidemiological research to 
predict and intervene at the public health level, to tell the best story possible about the 
research findings at hand, one doesn’t have to say that X causes Y to achieve such an 
outcome. In fact, one cannot definitively claim such a relationship. 
Lipton and Odegaard’s anti-causal stance is motivated by the belief that metaphysical 
causal claims are independent of, and even not needed for, the ‘use value’ of research 
findings for prediction and intervention. The two sentences ‘smoking causes lung 
cancer’ and ‘smoking two packs a day increases the risk of lung cancer by ten times’, 
according to Lipton and Odegaard, do not merely differ as to their semantics. The 
former—they claim—resorts to a “metaphysical and unsupported” notion of cause, 
whilst the latter already tells a causal story, and in particular it uses a language that 
allows practical uses such as prediction and interaction. Now, the “metaphysical and 
unsupported” notion of cause they refer to is Anscombe’s (1981) notion, which is 
cashed out in terms of necessary connection and instantiation of an exceptionless 
generalisation. I will keep aside historical considerations about the reception of and 
the critiques to Anscombe’s thought in the philosophical literature, and about the 
advancements in the philosophy of causality after Anscombe.  
The point is that Lipton and Odegard’s worry is simply dissolved once the 
epistemic theory is adopted, for epistemic causality is not metaphysically obscure 
(beliefs can be characterised precisely in probabilistic terms) nor untestable (it is 
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exactly on the basis of evidence that beliefs are formed and evaluated). The epistemic 
theory is not far from the position defended by Vineis (2003), where he says that we 
believe that smoking causes lung cancer on the basis of various sources of evidence, 
e.g., observations in humans, experiments in animals, knowledge about DNA 
damage in carcinogenesis, etc. This does not force epidemiologists to a ‘realist’ 
position according to which “empirical observations do refer to some reality in the 
external world (independently of theoretical models)” (Vineis 2003, p.85). 
Another advantage is that the epistemic theory encompasses different modus 
operandi of the cause.  Parascandola and Weed (2001) discuss five possible definitions 
of cause (production, necessary causes, sufficient-component causes, probabilistic 
causes, counterfactual causes) and complain that none attract unanimous consensus 
nor can account for causes in all domains. Consider causes as necessary factors. 
Agreed, the view that all causes must be necessary for their effects (traditionally 
associated to the germ theory of disease) has been discarded. Some causes aren’t 
necessary for the effect, e.g. carcinogenic substances, but some indeed are, for 
instance tuberculosis is caused by an infectious agent, which is necessary for the 
development of the disease. Under the epistemic theory, necessary and probabilistic 
causes can peacefully live together. Since causality is not physical, causes can be 
variables, particular entities, events, properties or facts, depending on the context. 
Consider the two causal claims ‘exposure to asbestos dust causes lung cancer’ and 
‘the bacteria streptococcus causes irritation and inflammation of the throat’. The first 
involves variables as causal relata and the cause thereby operating is probabilistic. 
The second, instead, involves different kinds of relata (bacteria are microorganisms, 
and irritation and inflammation of the throat is an event describing health status) and 
the cause is of type sufficient-component.5 It follows that necessary of probabilistic 
definitions of cause are not mutually exclusive definitions—that depends on the 
disease. The point is that we deem some relations to be causal and causality lies exactly 
in this epistemic activity of evaluating the available evidence. 
                                                     
 
5 “A sufficient-component cause is made up of a number of components, no one of which is 
sufficient for the disease on its own. When all the components of the disease are present, however, a 
sufficient cause is formed”. (Parascandola and Weed 2001, 907) 
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Furthermore, the epistemic theory is not in contradiction with the definitions of 
cause given in Sec. 1. The question is, rather, why are causes consistently defined in 
terms of difference-making? The temptation would be to infer that those definitions 
underpin a difference-making metaphysic, namely that this is what causality is—to 
make a difference to the effect. But this is a fallacious way of reasoning for various 
reasons. One is that some causes are not be difference-makers. For instance, causes of 
states might work differently. The pillar causes the building to stand but is not a 
difference-maker. The pillar just stands there and makes the building to stand as 
well.6 Therefore difference-making is not a universal feature of causes. Another 
reason, as mentioned above, is that difference-making is evidence we need to establish 
whether a factor is causal, it does not coincide with the very concept of causation. 
The reason why definitions of cause prominently display difference-making 
considerations, instead, is that they reflect the variational epistemology and 
methodology discussed in Sec. 2. That is to say, difference-making definitions of 
cause reflect how we come to know whether something is a cause—the how question 
is answered by methodology and epistemology. Let me emphasise that whether we 
deem something a cause is still an epistemic activity, so the question is not to reveal 
once and for all what the ‘secret connection’ is; there is no secret connection 
indeed—causality, in epistemic terms, simply results from the epistemology and 
methodology used by the epidemiologists. 
4. Summary and conclusion 
Causal issues are extremely important in epidemiology: adopting and justifying an 
explicit causal stance, disentangling notions such as the ‘causal web’, let alone 
providing workable definitions of cause. This paper examined the definitions of the 
concept of cause found in survey papers or textbooks in epidemiology. Those 
definitions all share a common feature: they say what the job of a cause is, that is to 
bring about changes in the distribution of disease or in individual health status. I 
argued that those definitions underpin a ‘variational’ epistemology and methodology, 
but not a ‘variational’ or ‘difference-making’ metaphysics. 
                                                     
 
6 For a discussion about causes of states and difference-making, see Russo (2008, ch.3). 
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 By discussing the goals of epidemiological research I showed that the causal 
epistemology in epidemiology hinges upon the notion of variation rather than 
regularity. Therefore, the definitions of cause underpin a variational epistemology. 
Similarly, because causal methods in epidemiology are essentially comparative, 
methodology in epidemiological research is variational too. I then went on arguing 
that those definitions do not underpin a variational metaphysics and that causality in 
epidemiology is better interpreted according to the epistemic theory. According to 
the epistemic theory, causality is not a physical property of things or of the world, 
but rather represent particular beliefs of the individual, in our case the 
epidemiologist. A key feature of epistemic causality is that it clearly distinguishes 
between the very concept of cause and the evidence needed to establish causal 
claims. Definitions of cause in epidemiology consistently point to difference-making 
because this is a crucial evidence for disease causation and in fact it reflects the way 
epidemiologists come to know about causal relations, namely the variational 
epistemology and methodology of epidemiological research. 
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